Science and ideology : the case of physics in nazi Germany by Ball, Philip
Science, it is often said, must be free from ideology. 
Scientists should seek knowledge that is independent 
of the prevailing sociopolitical preoccupations, 
and not allow political views to enter their work. 
Many scientists believe the corollary: that when 
science does encounter political interference, it is 
compromised, perhaps fatally. But neither of these 
things is necessarily true. 
In his 1969 analysis of 
science’s response to the 
politics of its time, historian 
Joseph Haberer concluded 
that «an idealization of science 
as a superior form of activity 
remains deeply entrenched in 
the contemporary scientific 
consciousness» (Haberer, 
1969). The belief that science 
should somehow be «above» 
politics, Haberer showed, has 
been evident at least since the inception of modern 
science in the seventeenth century. One can say that it 
remains widespread today. 
Scientists often argue that they cannot be expected 
to be proficient in making moral, ethical and political 
judgements as well as technical ones. And how can 
they possibly expect to foresee the ways in which 
their work will be applied, let alone then ensure that 
only beneficial uses are pursued? If they were to be 
held accountable for such applications, would they not 
either be regulated and constrained beyond measure, 
not to mention legally vulnerable, or lose all their 
time to bureaucracy? 
But although it is true to say that scientists have no 
special moral competency, the statement is somewhat 
self-fulfilling. Scientific training rarely incorporates 
an ethical dimension. Even when it does, the emphasis 
tends to be solely on codes of 
professional conduct: issues such 
as intellectual property, citation, 
treatment of staff, conflicts of 
interest and whistle-blowing. Yet 
there are broader responsibilities 
too, as the development of 
nuclear weapons during the 
Second World War made clear 
by revealing how socially and 
politically transformative, not to 
mention how destructive, a new 
technology can be.
In the light of developments such as genetic 
engineering and nanotechnology, there is far 
greater awareness today that new technologies 
raise important societal and ethical questions 
that should be debated within and beyond the 
scientific community in parallel with their technical 
development. Yet this has not necessarily bred a 
readiness in scientists to engage with these matters 
beyond the role of offering technical advice. A 
common response is to acknowledge that these are 
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important questions but to insist that they must be left 
for «others», or for «society», to decide. 
Nonetheless, the Manhattan Project and the 
nuclear arms race that followed played a big part in 
cultivating among scientists a recognition of wider 
responsibility. So have many other episodes since 
then, among them environmental despoliation and 
climate change, thalidomide, the link between 
smoking and cancer, genetic engineering, Chernobyl, 
AIDS, embryo research and synthetic biology. It 
would be unfair to suggest that science continues 
doggedly to insist on its abstract purity and 
detachment from morality and politics. 
An important acknowledgement of the scientist’s 
ethical duties occurred in 1975, when many 
leading biologists came together at the Asilomar 
Conference Center in Monterey, California, to 
discuss the implications of new techniques in genetic 
engineering: the ability to excise and insert genes into 
DNA. Such methods are now one of the dominant 
influences on molecular biology, being central not 
only to the creation of genetically modified organisms 
for research, agriculture and breeding, but also to 
new forms of medicine (gene therapies), cloning, 
and genomic profiling. As one attendee, the Nobel 
laureate biochemist Paul Berg, has put it, «Looking 
back now, this unique conference marked the 
beginning of an exceptional era for science and for 
the public discussion of science policy» (Berg, 1980).
Although Asilomar demonstrated a commendable 
readiness to consider consequences and accept 
inconvenient conclusions, Berg doubts whether the 
same approach will work today for some of the 
ethical issues raised by genetic and biomedical 
research, such as embryo research and stem-cell 
technology. It is one thing to evaluate objective health 
risks, even though this alone is hard enough in the 
face of unknown consequences and the vagaries of 
public risk perception. But when science confronts 
deeply held social and religious values, it is far from 
clear that a consensus can ever be reached, even 
by compromise. Society has to find some way of 
accommodating irreconcilably different views.
Much has changed since Haberer delivered his 
rather damning judgement on the political and moral 
acumen of scientific communities four decades 
ago, not least the growing awareness that science 
has a central role in tackling global crises such as 
environmental change and epidemic disease. But 
many scientists still cling to the shibboleth that their 
business is «apolitical», a search for truth unsullied by 
worldly affairs. When the state does intrude on and 
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effective means of resistance. While one cannot expect 
scientists to be braver or more morally astute than any 
other section of the population, science can and should 
as a community organize itself to maximize its ability 
to act collectively, ethically and – when necessary – 
politically. That objective would need to include more 
explicit recognition of the political nature of science 
itself. The practice of science, Haberer said, «is infused 
with problems which require political modes of thought 
and political instrumentalities» (Haberer, 1969).
n PHYSICS	UNDER	HITLER
The consequences of a lack of political engagement and 
ethical reflection became painfully clear in Germany 
shortly before and during the period of Nazi rule (1933-
1945) (Ball, 2014; Macrakis, 1993; Walker, 1995). The 
common view is that most German scientists gritted 
their teeth and got on with their 
research as best they could under 
compromised circumstances. 
Some have even suggested that 
the German physicists actively 
resisted collaboration with 
the government by dragging 
their heels or falsifying their 
calculations to ensure that 
Hitler did not have weapons of 
mass destruction at his disposal 
(Powers, 2000). 
This story is largely a myth. 
Partly it seems to be perpetuated 
because it fits with what many 
scientists would like to believe 
about their profession. But the myth was also in part 
an active attempt to salvage the reputation of German 
physics (Rammer, 2012) by applying what historian 
Dieter Hoffmann has called «formula of exoneration» 
(Hoffmann, 2005).
This debate about how to judge the response of the 
German physics community to Nazi rule continues to 
rage. It was reawakened in 1998 by Michael Frayn’s 
play Copenhagen, which examined the discussions 
in Nazi-occupied Denmark in 1943 between Werner 
Heisenberg, who arrived as a cultural ambassador for 
the German state, and his former mentor Niels Bohr. 
Controversy also flared up in 2006 following the 
publication of a book in which the Dutch physicist and 
Nobel laureate Peter Debye was accused of collusion 
with the Nazi regime (Rispens, 2006) – an accusation 
that led temporarily to the removal of Debye’s name 
from a Dutch university institute and a scientific award 
(Eickhoff, 2008). 
Did these scientists demonstrate any serious 
opposition to the totalitarian and anti-Semitic policies 
of the German National Socialists, or did they on 
the contrary adapt themselves to the regime? Was 
science commandeered and undermined by the 
National Socialists? These questions will not be 
addressed by trying to divide up German physicists 
between camps labelled «good» and «bad». It was 
impossible to remain in Nazi Germany without 
making compromises of some sort, and the vast 
majority of scientists were caught in a grey area 
between complicity and resistance. Rather than trying 
to condemn or exonerate individuals with comfortable 
hindsight, it is more useful to consider how the 
scientific community as a whole acted in such extreme 
circumstances.
Precisely because they were extreme, one must be 
careful about drawing any general conclusions about 
the way science responds to its 
political situation. Nonetheless, we 
have an obligation to look for such 
generalizations if we are going 
to learn from the past. In many 
ways the enormity of the situation 
simply threw a harsher spotlight 
on tendencies that already existed 
within the community – some of 
them shared with German society 
as a whole, others arguably unique 
to science. And although the world 
has changed in the past eight 
decades, there is good reason to 
believe that the example of physics 
in Nazi Germany has messages 
for the conduct and responsibilities of scientists that 
remain relevant today.
n ARYAN	PHYSICS	AND	NON-ARYAN	EXPULSIONS
Anti-Semitism festered in Germany long before the 
Nazi era. In physics it was given a prominent voice 
by Philipp Lenard, who won the 1905 Nobel Prize 
for his studies of cathode rays. In connection with 
this work, Lenard investigated the photoelectric effect 
– the expulsion of electrons from metals irradiated with 
ultraviolet light – and when in 1905 Einstein explained 
aspects of the effect in terms of Max Planck’s quantum 
hypothesis, Lenard felt his discoveries had been stolen. 
His bitterness deepened when Einstein was awarded 
the 1921 Nobel Prize in Physics for that work. Lacking 
the mathematical skills to cope with relativity and 
quantum theory, both of which Einstein pioneered, 
Lenard decided they were wrong and that their 
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widespread acceptance and acclaim were the result of 
a pro-Jewish conspiracy (Beyerchen, 1977).
Lenard was not the only influential scientist to 
attack Einstein in anti-Semitic terms. The 1919 
physics Nobel laureate Johannes Stark was another 
experimentalist confused and angered by the 
mathematical complexity that had recently entered 
physics. Like Lenard he was an extreme nationalist 
whose right-wing views were hardened by the First 
World War, and the two of them found common cause. 
In May 1924 they wrote an article called «The Hitler 
spirit and science», pledging support to the Nazi 
leader (Mosse, 1966). Lenard and Stark advocated 
an «Aryan physics» (Deutsche physik), which they 
wanted to replace the decadent «Jewish physics» of 
Einstein and his supporters.
Adolf Hitler was appointed Reichschancellor at the 
end of January 1933. Very quickly, Germany became 
a dictatorship as Hitler suspended civil liberties 
and imposed press censorship. In March the Nazis 
passed the Enabling Law, which gave Hitler power 
to legislate without the consent of the Reichstag and 
even to overrule the Constitution. The Civil Service 
Law followed in April, expelling Jews and political 
opponents from places of power and influence.
In Germany in the 1930s the so-called «Jewish 
question» was not regarded as a matter of basic 
human rights; it was a political matter, and therefore 
not something an academic should be concerned 
with. One could deplore the bad treatment of Jews 
– and many did – without feeling placed under any 
obligation to act or speak publicly about it in a 
professional capacity.
And so there were no prominent resignations 
among physicists who were not directly affected 
by the new laws. What good would resignation do, 
people asked? It would only deplete German physics 
further, without changing anything else. When some 
German scientists did dare to express concerns about 
Jewish expulsions, these were always couched in 
terms of the harm that the losses would do to German 
science, not in terms of the immorality of the laws. 
Many felt that the hardline aspects of Nazi rule 
would soften anyway, or that Hitler would soon lose 
power. The best course seemed to be to keep quiet 
and weather the storm. Max Planck, president of the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWS) that administered 
key institutes of German science, was on holiday 
in Sicily when the news of the Civil Service Laws 
broke, and saw no pressing need to return and deal 
with the implications. This was not indifference but a 
grave misapprehension of the nature of the National 
Socialist programme.
Planck had been brought up to observe complete 
obedience to the state, and had no idea what to do 
when the state turned out to be corrupt. His position is 
more tragic than despicable (Heilbron, 2000).
After Hitler’s election Stark was made president of 
the prestigious Institute of Physics and Technology 
of the German Reich (PTR) in Berlin. He announced 
that the PTR would thenceforth take charge of all 
German scientific periodicals. He instigated the 
«Führer principle» that the Nazis wished to see 
applied in all areas of life, and sacked all Jews from 
the advisory committee. But Stark and Lenard were 
angered that their colleagues seemed so slow to 
embrace the new regime; they felt that the KWS in 




































Jewish members. And certainly, the organization 
sought ways to resist political interference. When 
Max Planck retired as president after his second 
term of office ended in 1936, the senate elected as 
his successor the industrialist and chemistry Nobel 
laureate Carl Bosch, who as a non-academic was 
thought to be more immune to political pressure. But 
the Reich Education Ministry appointed the Nazi 
official Ernst Telschow as secretary of the KWS, and 
although it was not exactly nazified in the pre-war 
period, neither did it mount any effective resistance to 
the wishes of the government. In 1937 it expelled the 
remaining Jewish members.
n THE	WHITE	JEWS	OF	PHYSICS
One of the physicists most affected by Deutsche 
physik was Werner Heisenberg. Stark held a grudge 
against him ever since he had 
refused to attend a rally of the 
National Socialist Teachers 
League in Leipzig in November 
1933. Then at a gathering 
of the Society of German 
Scientists and Physicians in 
Hannover in September 1934, 
Heisenberg defended relativity 
and quantum theory against 
Stark’s accusations that they 
were speculative, and he 
even mentioned Einstein by 
name, earning him an official 
reprimand. 
In an address in Heidelberg 
in December 1935, Stark called Heisenberg a «spirit 
of Einstein’s spirit» (Cassidy, 2009). This speech was 
printed in the January issue of the Party periodical 
Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte. The following 
July Stark published in the SS journal Das Schwarze 
Korps a vilification of Heisenberg and others (such as 
Planck and Sommerfeld) who colluded in the «Jewish 
conspiracy» in physics without being themselves 
Jewish. These people, he said, were «White Jews»: a 
designation calculated to make them the legitimate 
targets of all the abuse heaped on the Jews themselves.
Desperate to retain his good name in Nazi 
Germany, Heisenberg appealed directly to Heinrich 
Himmler to save his «honour». Himmler ordered an 
investigation into Heisenberg’s character, and the 
Gestapo and SS bugged his house, placed spies in 
his classes, and questioned him on several occasions. 
This exhausting and frightening process finally 
resulted in a report that exonerated Heisenberg, 
portraying him as an «apolitical» scientist who was 
basically positive towards National Socialism and a 
good patriot. In July 1938 Himmler finally wrote to 
Heisenberg, saying «I do not approve of the attack 
of Das Schwarze Korps in its article, and I have 
proscribed any further attack against you» (Cassidy, 
2009). He also advised, however, that Heisenberg 
would do well not to mention Einstein in future. 
Heisenberg complied: in an article published in a 
Nazi periodical in 1943, he acknowledged Einstein’s 
discoveries while suggesting that they would have 
happened anyway. 
Heisenberg’s biographer David Cassidy explains 
that Heisenberg came to feel that the reputation of all 
German physics rested with him. «By seeing himself 
in such a grandiose rationalization for remaining 
in Germany», Cassidy writes, «he more easily 
succumbed to further compromises and ingratiation 
with the regime» (Cassidy, 2009). 
Heisenberg made his science a 
refuge from moral dilemmas, a 
higher plane untroubled by what 
he called «money politics». After 
the war he presented himself 
as a covert opponent to the 
Nazis, saying for example to 
the Dutch Jewish exile Samuel 
Goudsmit that «I knew… if we 
Germans did not succeed in 
undermining this system from 
the inside and finally to remove 
it, then an enormous catastrophe 
would break loose which would 
cost the lives of millions of 
innocent people in Germany and other countries» 
(Heisenberg, 1948). He insisted that his inaction and 
accommodation during the Nazi era was in fact the 
only form of active opposition that could have had any 
effect. In response, Goudsmit rightly pointed out that 
the German physicists had been largely silent on the 
morality of the regime under which they had served 
(Goudsmit, 1948). 
n IN	THE	CASE	OF	PETER	DEBYE
Questions about where passive acceptance of the 
situation merges with collusion are still more 
complicated in the case of the Dutch physicist 
Peter Debye, the 1936 Nobel laureate who made his 
career for the most part in Germany and became 
one of its most powerful representatives (Ball, 
2014; Eickhoff, 2008; Hoffmann & Walker, 2011). 
Debye was unusual in having both experimental 
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and theoretical expertise, his particular speciality 
being the interactions of atoms and molecules with 
electric fields and electromagnetic radiation – a 
topic that relied increasingly on the new concepts 
introduced by quantum theory. When the Nazis came 
to power, Debye was, like Heisenberg, a member of 
the faculty at Leipzig University. But in 1934 Max 
Planck appointed Debye as director of the new Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Physics (KWIP), built in Berlin 
with funding from the philanthropic Rockefeller 
Foundation in America.
Then in the autumn of 1937 Debye was elected as 
chairman of the German Physical Society (DPG, for 
its German acronym). This was one of the few official 
organizations in Germany still not to have rigorously 
excluded all its Jewish members, although many had 
left of their own accord and very few remained by 
this stage. The government authorities made it clear 
that these few too must be expelled, and Debye saw 
that the DPG might simply be taken over by the Nazis 
if it did not comply. In December of 1937 he sent a 
letter to members asking all classed by the Nazi laws 
as Jews to withdraw from membership. 
This is not the prima facie evidence of collusion 
that it has sometimes been made out to be. If the DPG 
had not taken this step voluntarily, it would doubtless 
have been compelled to do so, 
with Debye being replaced by 
someone more compliant. The 
standard view among Debye’s 
colleagues was that resignations 
were a worthless gesture of 
defeat and cowardice. All the 
same, none seemed seriously 
able to consider what was 
achieved practically, or what was 
sacrificed morally, by staying in 
one’s post in a case like this.
There was more interference 
to come. In late 1938, Otto 
Hahn, the director of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry in Berlin, and his 
assistant Fritz Strassmann discovered experimental 
evidence for nuclear fission in uranium – an 
interpretation explained by Lise Meitner, who had 
been forced to flee to Sweden in July of that year but 
to whom the new puzzling findings were conveyed. It 
was immediately clear that uranium was a potential 
source of vast amounts of energy, which might be 
released in a controlled way to generate power, or 
in an uncontrolled way in a bomb of inconceivable 
destructiveness. When the Nazi authorities were 
informed, they decreed that the KWIP would be 
immediately given over to 
research on nuclear energy. With 
war in Europe now looking 
inevitable, a project this sensitive 
could not be entrusted to a non-
German – and so, two weeks 
after Britain declared war on 
Germany, Debye received a 
letter informing him that he must 
henceforth either relinquish his 
Dutch citizenship and become 
German, or resign. Instead, 
Debye negotiated a six-month 
leave of absence, during which 
time he would take up an invitation to deliver a series 
of lectures at Cornell in America. He left Europe in 
early January of 1940.
In America Debye told the officials at the 
Rockefeller Foundation about the nuclear research 
being planned at the KWIP, of which Werner 
Heisenberg eventually became director. It was partly 
this information that led Einstein and Leo Szilard to 
recommend to President Roosevelt the large-scale 
research project on the liberation of nuclear energy 
that eventually became the Manhattan Project. Debye 
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project, although he did undertake 
war research on artificial rubber 
and materials for radar. For a 
time he corresponded with the 
authorities in Berlin, seeming to 
keep open the possibility that he 
might return to his post there after 
the war. It is likely that his motives 
were at least partly concerned 
with his daughter and sister-in-law, 
who had remained behind in the 
director’s residence in Berlin. 
But Debye became a US 
citizen and never did go back to Berlin. Was this just 
opportunism? Or does it show that he emphatically 
rejected the Nazis and all they stood for? During 
Debye’s lifetime, these questions were never really 
asked, and he never raised them himself. Yet his flight 
from Germany was precipitated not by his abhorrence 
of Nazi policies, as some later accounts of his life 
seemed to imply, but by the demand that he renounce 
his Dutch nationality. If the Nazis had been prepared 
to tolerate a foreign national as the head of the physics 
institute, there seems no telling what Debye would have 
done. His family today insist that his mind was already 
set on leaving Germany, but there is no indication that, 
until he was served the ultimatum in September 1939, 
he had any plans to do so.
Debye surely faced a difficult choice. But what 
weighed most heavily in his decisions? The injustices 
and immorality of a regime that, by 1939, had become 
evidently barbaric? The good of his family? Or was it 
perhaps his statement in 1937 that provided his guiding 
principle? He had said: «It is always my custom to ask 
myself in what way I can be most useful for physics. 
That is the first consideration for me and other more 
personal considerations play a more secondary role» 
(Van Ginkel, 2006).
For scientists at that time, particularly in Germany, 
nothing would have seemed more noble than this 
determination to live and work only for science, free 
from the messy compromises and ambiguities of the 
political world. In a letter Debye wrote to his mentor 
Arnold Sommerfeld on the eve of his departure from 
Germany at the end of December 1939, we can find the 
essence of why he has been both attacked and defended. 
His philosophy, he wrote, was: «Not to despair and 
always be ready to grab the good which whisks 
by, without granting the bad any more room than is 
absolutely necessary. That is a principle of which I have 
already made much use» (Van Ginkel, 2006).
One could interpret this simply as an intention to 
remain optimistic, looking for ways 
to contribute something of value 
and to avoid harmful actions as far 
as possible – or as an indication 
that Debye was not prepared to 
change or challenge anything, but 
just to take advantage of whatever 
opportunities came his way. Which 
is correct? Debye gives no sign of 
having pondered the distinction 
himself. Perhaps his is simply a 
statement of shallow optimism, 
which will work well enough 
unless circumstances render it 
untenable. In Nazi Germany Debye appears to have been 
out of his moral depth. 
n ARE	SCIENTISTS	SPECIAL?
Debye has been called «an ordinary man in 
extraordinary circumstances» (Hoffmann & Walker, 
2006). While this formulation risks generalizing his 
particular weaknesses, it rings true in the sense that 
there was nothing especially egregious in those failings. 
Debye’s occasional self-interest and limited moral 
engagement, Heisenberg’s insecurity and egotism, 
Planck’s prevarication and misconceived notion of 
duty – none are profound character flaws, and all would 
have been minor blemishes on a fundamentally decent 
nature in happier circumstances. 
The more pertinent question is whether there is any 
reason to expect from Planck, Heisenberg and Debye 
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ambivalent moral stance, purely because they were 
scientists. Did their positions as leading members of 
the German physics community create obligations 
and expectations any more demanding than those one 
might impose on anyone else?
Yet the refusal to confront the ethical questions 
was not merely passive, but active. It was a common 
belief among German scientists between the wars 
that the proper conduct of their profession entailed 
an «apolitical» withdrawal into the realm of logic, 
abstraction and «truth». Because he engaged with 
worldly affairs, Einstein was condemned sometimes 
even by those who revered his work for «making 
science political». This conviction can still be detected 
in researchers today. Scientists pride themselves on 
offering facts, not opinions, and some insist on a 
distinction between the purity of scientific discovery 
and the dirty realities of its application.
The naivety of such a position was exposed in Nazi 
Germany. On the one hand, an «apolitical» stance left 
the scientists vulnerable to political manipulation. At 
the same time it was a façade, for the scientists used 
the bait of nuclear power to extract funds from the 
regime. They did not secure enough to come close 
to making a bomb by the end of the war, but that 
seems to have been primarily because they lacked any 
conviction that they could provide it, and did not wish 
to risk a failure to deliver; Manhattan-Project-scale 
money was allotted instead to the German rocket 
program.
It was through evasions, 
delusions and diversions, not 
collusions, that most scientists 
accommodated themselves to 
National Socialist Germany. 
Their vision was too narrow, their 
standards too conservative. It 
was not so much that these men 
blindly followed a redundant 
notion of duty, but that they seem 
actively to have constructed 
an idea of «duty to science» 
as a way of denying broader 
responsibilities. In that way, many German scientists 
found in their profession a justification for avoiding 
questions of social justice and probity.
n CONCLUSIONS:	SCIENCE	AND	DEMOCRACY
Seen against the wider historical backdrop, the 
behaviour of German physicists under the Nazis was 
not an aberration under extreme circumstances, but 
a fairly typical example of how science and politics 
interact. While German National 
Socialism cannot stand proxy 
for every autocracy in the 
modern world, the fate of science 
under its auspices challenges 
some preconceptions about the 
relationship of research and 
political democracy. Many 
Western scientists cleave to the 
idea that science can only truly 
flourish in a wholly free society. 
This attitude is unduly self-
congratulatory. There is ample evidence that oppressive 
regimes can foster the technical expertise needed to 
develop destructive weapons and other unwelcome 
technologies (Walker, 2003). German scientists under 
Nazi rule were perfectly able to conduct vibrant and 
productive science – just as, during the height of the 
Cold War when state oppression in the Soviet Union 
was even more extreme, Soviet scientists were capable 
of innovative and effective scientific research. All 
but the most fanatical regimes will recognize the 
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importance of science and will 
be prepared, as the Nazis were, 
to sacrifice ideological goals for 
pragmatic ones. Challenging 
the idea that science and 
mathematics are inherently 
democratic, historian Herbert 
Mehrtens argues that «they will 
adapt to political and social 
changes as long as there is the 
chance to preserve existence», and there is no reason 
«why mathematics, and any other science, should 
not find a perfect partner in technocratic fascism» 
(Renneburg & Walker, 1994).
Political interference in science does not happen 
only in dictatorships. Democratically elected 
politicians have also challenged the autonomy, 
authority, integrity and validity of science. Not 
only do they sometimes find it expedient to ignore 
inconvenient advice from scientists, but they are 
not above manipulation of evidence: in 2007 the US 
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform concluded that the George 
W. Bush Administration had engaged in a systematic 
effort to manipulate climate change science and 
mislead policymakers and the public (US House 
of Representatives Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 2007). One might reasonably 
argue that democracy is the least bad of political 
systems for guarding against such interference. But 
the assumption that democracy guarantees good 
science, and that totalitarianism makes it impossible, 
finds little support in history. 
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